CS Lewis's Thomistic philosophy of emotions
CS Lewis's "men with chests" are best understood through Thomas Aquinas's "charioteer" theory of how emotion should integrate into reason.
He that ruleth his spirit is better than he that taketh a city. (cf. Proverbs 16:32)
Our emotions are powerful, and we are often tempted either to try to ignore them, so as to be more reasonable, or to reduce reason to the level of mere emotions. The first produces inhuman robots, the second produces inhuman animals. Aquinas’s theory of the relationship between reason and emotion sees the integration of emotion into the rule of reason as a way of strengthening our reasonable virtue. I was struck by the similarity of his conception of emotion to that of CS Lewis’s “men with chests,” in The Abolition of Man. I argue that Aquinas’s theory is compatible with and adds philosophical depth to Lewis’s vision of “men with chests.”
Aquinas’s “charioteer with horses”
Aristotle wrote that “The soul rules the body with the authority of a master: reason rules the appetite with the authority of a statesman.”1 Aquinas, in his commentary on Aristotle, memorably draws a further analogy: of reason being like a charioteer, with emotion being the horses. Before we get to what this means, let us analyse Aquinas’s thought on the links between emotion and reason, using the four-pronged structure provided by Professor Finnis in Aquinas (III.4), though I slightly change the order:
Firstly, emotions may positively motivate us towards good actions. This is necessary, for many good actions. A king needs his people to enact his commands, and one not supported by his people will not be long in power. Furthermore, it is clear that a king is more virtuous qua kingliness when he is supported by his people. In a similar way, rational commands with no emotional love behind them are unlikely to rule our conduct very effectively. Furthermore, the support of emotions, according to Aquinas, also makes rational actions more virtous: “An aspect of the perfection of the morally good is that the acting person be moved not only by will but also by his sentient appetites.”2 Who can deny that maternal love makes more valuable the care of a child?
However, secondly, emotions may resist, but not reject the commands of reason. It is natural that civilians would be reluctant to obey a king’s command to pay taxes—this is not a bad emotion. Nonetheless, when the command is reasonable (ie, for the common good), the good citizen obeys. Similarly, it is natural that fear would make it harder to storm the beach at Normandy—would anyone call out as less virtuous a soldier who feels this fear and obeys nonetheless, because reason tells him that obeying his superior is the right thing to do? It seems that emotion may resist, but must ultimately yield when reason commands.
Thirdly, emotions can decide between multiple good choices. In the modern day, the ruler can here be interpreted analogously to a constitution which mandates the rule of law and human rights. The commands of this rule may not be violated by democracy but, so long as the rule of law and our human rights are respected, it is right to allow the people through democracy to decide between multiple good options (eg, how do we want to regulate the provision of healthcare?) Similarly, when reason determines that multiple options are good, thus having exercised its supervision and ultimate rule, the emotions ought to be allowed to decide between them.
In conclusion, then, reason must make the decisions. This, of course, means that emotions may not overthrow reason’s rule (even as they motivate or resist them). Just like a ruler should not cede to a violent revolution of the masses, so our reason may not cede to whims and passions. If we do so, we lose what is human about us, and we end up with decisions that fail to keep a steady eye on the good. More insidiously, Aquinas also points out that our reason can also avoid its duty to make reflected and truly rational decisions and instead “rationalise” decisions made by our passions. As he himself puts it: “So as to be able to pursue and enjoy their desires freely, people have thought to find reasons why fornications and other sexual pleasures are not wrong, but the reasons.”3 When we act in this way, the ruler becomes the servant of those who should be ruled.
In summary, emotions are not the rulers, but are rather forces that strengthen the virtue of the ruler, reason. This, then, allows us properly to analyse Aquinas’s analogy of a charioteer (reason) and his horses (emotion). While reason provides supervision and the final direction, emotions properly channeled provide the strength that pushes us across the finish line. Without the charioteer, the horses are wild. Without the horses, the charioteer is powerless. When both are integrated into their proper relationship with one another, the combination makes for a beautiful sight, a fast race - one may say, for a virtuous chariot.
An easy example that presents itself for analysis through the four theses is the decision of a spouse, which combines reason and emotion at every stage. (1) Positive emotions may motivate us in moving towards marriage, and will prove an invaluable support of it; (2) We may feel negative emotions like nervousness or fear of commitment, but pushing through them makes the walk to the altar all the more virtuous; (3) Emotion should make the choice between the (many) people in the world who reason approves as appropriate choices; but (Conclusion) We should not make a decision for someone because our emotions are in their favour, when reason tells us to run away. Reason must ultimately rule.
Lewis’s “men with chests”
In the first chapter of CS Lewis’s The Abolition of Man (or rather, in the first lecture of the series), Lewis argues against the educational method employed by a textbook which aims to rid the pupils of sentimentalism. Allow me to quote here:
“In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of the bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism (such as [the textbook authors] would wince at) about a flag or a country or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the 'spirited element'. The head rules the belly through the chest—the seat, as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity, of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment—these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.”
Now, I think that nobody would argue that we should be rid of all sentiment. This above paragraph seems to speak to part of our 1st and 2nd theses from Aquinas above: Our emotions may be effective in strengthening us to take a good action, or providing resistance for an action that should only be taken if reason truly commands it. The authors of the textbook would likely agree with, calling sentiment perhaps enjoyable, or useful.4 However, Lewis attributes a greater importance to sentiment than mere “usefulness,” arguing further that sentiment can be correct or incorrect, reasonable or unreasonable:
“I myself do not enjoy the society of small children … [but] recognize this as a defect in myself—just as a man may have to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind. And because our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel liking for what ought to be approved) or out of harmony with reason (when we perceive that liking is due but cannot feel it). No emotion is, in itself, a judgement; in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it.”
For Lewis, it is not only relevant that the chariot has power, but in fact that the power of the chariot is pointed in the right direction. The race track goes forwards, and the charioteer must train his horses to go in the right direction. Similarly, reason must retain command over its emotions, ensuring that it is not simply rationalising itself by pointing the chariot whichever way the horses go. Doing so, which Lewis calls “exiting the Tao,” may prove disastrous.
Lewis and Aquinas
Lewis argues that sentimentalism, or emotion, can be a support for virtue. However, he also argues that emotion must be correctly ordered—according to reason. Lewis’s conceptions can be well understood by framing them Thomistically. Let us then, with reference to the four key theses provided above, analyse Lewis’s thought on emotions:
Firstly, emotions may positively motivate us towards good actions. Doing so not only makes them more effective, but also makes them more virtuous. As Lewis points out, when our positive emotions have been trained well to love good things, they motivate us towards good acts, eg, sentimentalism about a flag will motivate us to fight for the good (Lewis, who delivered these lectures during the Second World War, often uses military analogies). Lewis, like Aquinas, turns to Aristotle here: “Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought. When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained in 'ordinate affections' or 'just sentiments' will easily find the first principles in Ethics.” By this integration into reason’s rule, emotions provide the horsepower behind our good acts. More useful, more virtuous.
Secondly, emotions may resist, but not reject the commands of reason. When our negative emotions repel us from some command, we should inspect it. At times, we may recognise the negative emotions as good (eg, being afraid of death in war), but still realise that the commands of reason will mean we must act in spite of them. Despite having served in the First World War and surely having a severe emotional repulsion from the atrocities thereof, Lewis still accepts that war may (as it was in his time) be necessary. If we learn to evaluate our negative emotions as emotions, we are able to compare them with the commands of reason, and are able to act despite the repulsion. Thereby, we are made more useful, and more virtuous.
Thirdly, emotions can decide between multiple good choices. Lewis doesn’t discuss this third point at length.5 I think it is clear that he doesn’t see one specific path in life as the only good one: He married a woman who was dying, and never had children of his own, but clearly supported those who decided on marriage and having children; He divided his time between multiple good pursuits-creative writing, academia-and never focussed on the “one” that he thought best. This provides a fuller (more “effective”) life, by allowing us to focus on our strengths, and use our emotions to support our reason, and also allows us to live a more virtuous one, by not focussing purely on some consequentialist conception of what is “most useful.”
Finally, reason must ultimately rule. Our reason, not our emotion, is the ultimate source that may tell us when something is good. Lewis, for example, may know that life is good, that the family is good, and that the family contributes to life through producing children. Therefore, he knows that children are good. Nonetheless, he dislikes children. He therefore recognises that his emotions are, in fact, defective. They are wrong. If we do not do so, we will be less effective, ruled by whim. Moreover, we will chase after things that are not good - less effective, less virtuous.
Producing men with chests
The philosophical similarities between Lewis’s “men with chests” and Aquinas’s charioteer model are no coincidence. Both of them are, as Lewis said, “in the Tao,” or as modern philosophers would say, “in the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics school, as interpreted by the Western Judeo-Christian tradition.” More relevantly, both thinkers worked towards inculcating virtue through their philosophies. As Lewis convincingly argues in The Abolition of Man, emotion can be a great support towards virtuous action. St Thomas’s theory of the relationship between emotion and reason shows us why this is so.
Aristotle, Politics (Oxford World’s Classics 1995) 1254b2.
Aquinas, ST I-II q. 24 a. 3c.
Aquinas, In Eph. 5.3 ad v. 6
For what, exactly, such a sentiment would be useful is a separate question. In the rest of The Abolition of Man, Lewis rails against the idea of “usefulness” as a valid metric, for ultimately, when you dig down to the depths of “Useful for what?” “And why is that good?” you must end up with some conception of the good. I highly recommend reading the rest. The lectures are only ca. 1.5h long on Audible in the CS Lewis Collection, so I imagine the text (which can be found online) can be read quite quickly.
If anybody knows of some place where Lewis discusses this, which I think is closely related to the incommensurability of basic values, I would be very happy to add that to this essay.